Q: How many people will have to be CRB checked in the first year of the new scheme?
A: 1.77 million
And that's the government's estimate, so it's safe to say it's a minimum…
By Alex Deane
Innocent until proven guilty, or innocent until your DNA partially matches? The Mail on Sunday has revealed that officers regularly trawl the National Database for possible profile matches when they hit a dead-end in their investigations:
Figures obtained by The Mail on Sunday show that detectives are ordering weekly searches of the DNA database for people with no immediate connection to any crime.
The searches are used when crime scene DNA samples produce no direct match on the system.
Investigators then trawl millions of other records looking for a partial match, which might indicate that the suspect is related to an innocent person on the system.
More to the point, what happens – as the godfather of DNA profiling Sir Alec Jeffreys said – if “there is some glitch in the
database that made a false match to my DNA profile and that brings me
into the frame of a criminal investigation which has very serious
Which is probably why Lee Wyatt from Dereham (right), who was arrested and charged with assault but cleared of any wrongdoing in his local court, has taken to walking around the town with a sandwich board to try and get his DNA back from Norfolk Constabulary.
We wish Lee the best of luck but we're not holding our breath…
By Dylan Sharpe
Florian Leppla is a Campaigner with the Open Rights Group, a non-profit company working to defend freedom of expression, privacy, innovation, consumer rights
and creativity on the net.
The Digital Economy Bill, currently being debated in the House of Lords, would give the Government the power to disconnect people from the internet if copyright files are downloaded without permission. The Government, heavily lobbied by the music industry, seems convinced that's the way to stop illicit file sharing and downloading of music. What's certain is that entire families could be be disconnected if only one member (or lodger or guest) is accused of illegal downloading.
The bill doesn't acknowledge that account holder and infringer can be different people. That's the problem. The account holder will be liable for any infringement, whether he or she has infringed or not. That means that a whole family is punished because of the action of one person. This person can be anyone using their internet: a family member, a guest visiting, a lodger or a neighbour using their open wifi.
A lot of people need the internet for work or depend on if for their eduction. The Government has encouraged that and has pledged to connect citizens to the web, not disconnect them.
Gordon Brown said last year that "the internet is as vital as water and gas". Would he then consider cutting off people's water supply if their kids had shoplifted?
Disconnection is collective punishment. It is unacceptable. It is unfair and it is disproportionate.
What can you do?
1) Ask your MP to help remove the disconnection from the bill. Contact your MP now!
2) Write to your local paper and let people know that disconnection is wrong.
3) Sign up with the Open Rights Group to support our work.
Over at Reason.com an interesting article by the ever-thoughtful Brendan O'Neill – How Britain is using classical music as a form of social control.
Of course, we all know about the use of Beethoven & friends to deter young people from spending time in train stations – the new story is the decision by schools to subject
badly behaved children to Mozart and others. In “special detentions,” the children are forced to endure two hours of classical music both as a relaxant… and as a deterrent against future bad behavior (apparently the number of disruptive pupils has fallen by 60 per cent since the detentions were introduced.)
… some of the children who have endured this Mozart authoritarianism now find classical music unbearable. As one critical commentator said, they will probably “go into adulthood associating great music—the most bewitchingly lovely sounds on Earth—with a punitive slap on the chops.” This is what passes for education in Britain today: teaching kids to think “Danger!” whenever they hear Mozart’s Requiem or some other piece of musical genius.
Sounds familiar? It should -
Anthony Burgess’s nightmare vision of an elite using high culture as a “punitive slap on the chops” for low youth has come true. In Burgess’s 1962 dystopian novel A Clockwork Orange, famously filmed by Stanley Kubrick in 1971, the unruly youngster Alex is subjected to “the Ludovico Technique” by the crazed authorities. Forced to take drugs that induce nausea and to watch graphically violent movies for two weeks, while simultaneously listening to Beethoven, Alex is slowly rewired and re-moulded. But he rebels, especially against the use of classical music as punishment.
Pleading with his therapists to turn the music off, he tells them that “Ludwig van” did nothing wrong, he “only made music.” He tells the doctors it’s a sin to turn him against Beethoven and take away his love of music. But they ignore him. At the end of it all, Alex is no longer able to listen to his favorite music without feeling distressed. A bit like that schoolboy in Derby who now sticks his fingers in his ears when he hears Mozart.
By Alex Deane
Kevin Geraghty-Shewan had taken four-year-old Ben to the Bridges
Shopping Centre in Sunderland and took a picture of him while they were out shopping. He was accused of being a paedophile and threatened with arrest.
He told Sky News:
I took the picture on my phone and suddenly this security guard came up and told me it wasn't allowed because I could be a paedophile.
He told the guard that Ben was his son, but the guard replied that he couldn't prove it. A few minutes later Geraghty-Shewan was accosted by a policeman, who must have been contacted by the centre. The officer demanded his name and address, asked what I was doing in Sunderland, and said he had the right to delete my pictures.
Naturally, being confronted with this nonsense, Geraghty-Shewan became annoyed and raised his voice, and the officer threatened him with arrest "for breach of the peace."
Both the security guard and the police officer in this case are examples of the absurd reaction many people exhibit when they see fathers with their children.
This country has a destructive obsession with paedophilia. It is harming both parenthood and childhood, and it acts as a magic watchword for petty bureaucrats using overbearing powers.
By Alex Deane
Washington Monthly has used the notable "cold hit" case of John Puckett as a starting point for a remarkably significant, researched, extended piece on the use of DNA in court cases. An extract to show the quality:
Typically, law enforcement and prosecutors rely on FBI estimates for the rarity of a given DNA profile—a figure can be as remote as one in many trillions when investigators have all thirteen markers to work with. In Puckett’s case, where there were only five and a half markers available, the San Francisco crime lab put the figure at one in 1.1 million—still remote enough to erase any reasonable doubt of his guilt. The problem is that, according to most scientists, this statistic is only relevant when DNA material is used to link a crime directly to a suspect identified through eyewitness testimony or other evidence. In cases where a suspect is found by searching through large databases, the chances of accidentally hitting on the wrong person are orders of magnitude higher.
The reasons for this aren’t difficult to grasp: consider what happens when you take a DNA profile that has a rarity of one in a million and run it through a database that contains a million people; chances are you’ll get a coincidental match. Given this fact, the two leading scientific bodies that have studied the issue—the National Research Council and the FBI’s DNA advisory board—have recommended that law enforcement and prosecutors calculate the probability of a coincidental match differently in cold-hit cases. In particular, they recommend multiplying the FBI’s rarity statistic by the number of profiles in the database, to arrive at a figure known as the Database Match Probability. When this formula is applied to Puckett’s case (where a profile with a rarity of one in 1.1 million was run through a database of 338,000 offenders) the chances of a coincidental match climb to one in three.
Such coincidental matches are more than a theoretical possibility, as Chicago police can attest. In 2004, detectives investigating a string of robberies on the city’s North Side found some skin cells that the culprit had left behind at one crime scene, which contained six DNA markers. When they ran this profile against Illinois’s offender database, they found it matched a woman named Diane Myers. There was just one problem: when the burglaries in question were committed, Myers was already in jail, serving time on drug charges.
Indeed, the little information that has come to light about the actual rate of coincidental matches in offender databases suggests the chances of hitting on the wrong person may be even higher than the Database Match Probability suggests. In 2005… an Arizona state employee named Kathryn Troyer had run a series of tests on the state’s DNA database, which at the time included 65,000 profiles, and found multiple people with nine or more identical markers. If you believe the FBI’s rarity statistics, this was all but impossible—the chances of any two people in the general population sharing that many markers was supposed to be about one in 750 million, while the Database Match Probability for a nine-marker match in a system the size of Arizona’s is roughly one in 11,000.
It's technical stuff admittedly, but that's just what convicts people for things they may not have done. If you're interested in this subject, the article is really a "must read".
The piece is also covered by the security consultant blogging as Mass
Private I, who highlights the attempts of law enforcement to suppress
information about flaws in statistics rather than share it as they
should – which is significant, and terrible, as juries thinking the
numbers mean something very different to the truth can wind up
convicting the defendant.
This finds support in another useful piece about the Washington Monthly essay over at Rants
of a Public Defender; after pointing out the significant shortcomings of legal defence teams in relation to DNA evidence, she rightly concludes,
They don't want us poking around too much and investigating the truth of
their scientific claims. They don't want to do the hard work to get at
the right results; they just want the quick, dirty, and easy answers,
evidently without concern for whether those answers are the right ones.
Once again, when science and law enforcement come together, scientific
integrity inevitably takes the back seat…
We have got to fight against the criminal justice system's reluctance to
get at the best evidence. We have got to break the hold that DNA
evidence has over us. Otherwise, we'll never get to the truth of it.
A selection of related posts – the DNA myth, wrongful arrest due to DNA, the "return my DNA" campaign, DNA madness, less than 1% of crimes solved with DNA, removal of samples from innocent people is random, DNA / PNC, DNA testing and employability, arrests just to get us on the database, and an extended and updated piece from me on Con Home.
By Alex Deane
A remarkable and disquieting piece of footage over at the Oxford Times site. Stephen Russell, in his late 50s, was on a trip to buy fish and chips in Kidlington High Street when he spotted police swarming around. He had his camera with him and took four photos because it was unusual to see so much action in the village.
An officer wrongly demanded the ex-RAF engineer delete the photos. Mr Russell rightly refused – it is not illegal to photograph police in a public place.
He was then searched using powers under Section 43 of the Terrorism Act,.
He recorded the incident. Go and watch the footage. It's simply astonishing. Amongst other things, the fool of a bullying, overbearing policeman said, to a law-abiding member of the public who had done nothing wrong
You are a stranger in Kidlington – tell me who you are – what is your reason for being here
On what possible basis was any of that asked? We don't live in a country in which the police can demand our papers, to state our business. Moreover, just look at the way this oaf treats a palpably honest and reasonable member of the public. The domineering "I'm in charge, you justify yourself to me" attitude is typical of the way that the police are working very hard to lose the confidence of the law-abiding majority, who no longer feel that they're on our side.
Moreover, what absurd bit of self-serving sophistry – total dishonesty, really – to use Terrorism Act powers to search this man. He was very, very obviously not a terrorist. It is behaviour like this that undermines belief in the government's terror agenda and shows that powers such as these can't be given to officers, because they abuse them. The officer should now be required to justify his use of Terrorism Act powers in this case and if he can't, then he should be disciplined.
Let me say this loud and clear, so that there's no mistaking it:
PC Steve Burchett, you are a disgrace.
1) how fortunate that Mr Russell was able to record this incident. Given the footage, the police should take is seriously – if he had not, it would no doubt have been a "one person's word against another" damp squib.
2) cases like this make me think, more and more, that there needs to be a right to photograph police officers enshrined in law. What do you think about that..?
By Alex Deane
As I forewarned yesterday, The Office of The Identity Commissioner has presented his First Annual Report to Parliament to very mercifully little fanfare.
The document, which can be viewed on his website, is a mostly unremarkable piece of work with very little insight into the government's plans for the Identity Register.
Despite this, it does reveal that in the past three months around 5,000 people have been issued with identity cards and the Commissioner's office has spent £565,000.
That's over a hundred quid a card. At this rate if the government fulfills its aim of getting the whole population onto the National Identity Register, Britain will go bankrupt before Portsmouth FC.
And that's without mentioning the fact that both the Conservatives and Lib Dems have pledged to scrap the entire project.
In other woeful privacy news, this morning Blackburn Council held a launch event for the roll-out of the ID card scheme in their town; with Councillor Suleman Khonat weakly toeing the party line and being the first in the birthplace of John Morley to sign-up to a lifetime of noxious intrusion.
Money is being frittered away on a scheme that is supposed to be voluntary, yet has more publicity churned out about it than most other government campaigns.
Expensive, intrusive and unnecessary…remind you of anything?
By Dylan Sharpe
Pervasive security cameras don't substantially reduce crime. This fact has been demonstrated repeatedly: in San Francisco, California, public housing; in a New York apartment complex; in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; in Washington; in study after study in both the U.S. and the U.K. Nor are they instrumental in solving many crimes after the fact.
There are exceptions, of course, and proponents of cameras can always cherry-pick examples to bolster their argument. These success stories are what convince us; our brains are wired to respond more strongly to anecdotes than to data. But the data are clear: CCTV cameras have minimal value in the fight against crime.
And later, crucially, a paragraph which effectively reflects the approach of our report:
The important question isn't whether cameras solve past crime or deter
future crime; it's whether they're a good use of resources. They're
expensive, both in money and in their Orwellian effects on privacy and
civil liberties. Their inevitable misuse is another cost; police have
spied on naked women in their own homes, shared nude images, sold
best-of videos and even spied on national politicians. Though we might
be willing to accept these downsides for a real increase in security,
cameras don't provide that.
P.S. also of interest – a useful article on drones and surveillance more generally over at Comment is Free